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THE QUEST FOR ORGANIC GROWTH
Executive
Summary:
Every
business leader strives for more organic growth — more customers,
more revenues, and more operating efficiencies. Organic growth
is different than the creation of earnings through accounting
elections or valuations, financial engineering, structured transactions,
related party transactions, or the serial acquisition of revenue
through mergers and acquisitions.
I
have spent the past 4 years researching and studying high organic
growth companies. This research began with the creation of a financial
model, The Organic Growth Index ("OGI") which was designed
to illuminate high economic value-creating companies who have
consistently outperformed their industry competition primarily
through organic growth. In three separate studies between 1996-
2003, of over 800 high economic value-creating public companies,
I discovered that less than 5% of them consistently created such
value through organic growth. In-depth research was performed
with 22 of those companies in an attempt to understand how they
achieved such spectacular results. The findings of these studies
can be found in my recently released book, THE ROAD TO ORGANIC
GROWTH: HOW GREAT COMPANIES CONSISTENTLY GROW MARKETSHARE FROM
WITHIN (McGraw-Hill, 2006).
My primary
findings were: (1) the 6 keys to organic growth; (2) that many
of the current management consulting theories are not necessary
for consistent high organic growth; (3) the common organic growth
strategic progression or sequence; (4) and as importantly, that
organic growth is much more than a strategy - it is a seamless,
linked, self-reinforcing system.
The
22 companies that my model identified as consistent high organic
growth companies earned an Average Return on Equity of 28% for
the period 1999-2004. For the period of 1996- 2003, their cumulative
stock market returns outperformed the NASDAQ DJIA, and S&P
500 indices by multiples of 4, 7 and 10 times, respectively. The
22 companies researched were: American Eagle Outfitters, Inc,
Automatic Data Processing, Inc, (ADP), Bed Bath & Beyond,
Inc., Best Buy Co., Inc., Brinker International, Inc., EOG Resources,
Inc., Family Dollar Stores, Inc., Gentex Corporation, Harley-Davidson,
Inc., Mylan Laboratories, Inc., NVR, Inc., Omnicom Group, Inc.,
Outback Steakhouse, Inc., PACCAR, Inc., Ross Stores, Inc., Stryker
Corporation, SYSCO Corporation, Tiffany and Company, Total Systems,
Inc., (TSYS), Walgreens Co., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and Waters
Company.
I had expected
to discover, as current management theories teach us, that high
organic growers would have better talent, better strategies, more
unique products or services, be the lowest-cost provider, have
more visionary and charismatic leaders, be the most innovative,
and be high outsourcers and off-shorers. To my surprise, I discovered
that none of these theories were necessary or consistently prevalent
in my 22 high organic growth companies.
The common
denominators across the companies were the 6 keys to organic growth.
The 6 keys to organic growth are: (1) A simple focused "elevator
pitch" business model which can be easily understood by the
average employee; (2) a "small company soul" in a big
company body—companies entrepreneurially structured with "ownership"
cultures but with strong central "back office" controls
over quality, risk, and capital; (3) measurement maniacs—these
companies measure many financial, operational, and behavioral
metrics daily and weekly, with transparency, frequent feedback,
and the alignment of measurements and rewards ; (4) they have
highly engaged workforces with intense loyalty, high retention.,
and high productivity; (5) they are led by passionate home-grown,
humble leaders who are intimately involved on daily basis in the
details of operations; and (6) they are technology and execution
champions.
Many of
you are saying that your company does some of these things well.
However, the major difference is that these companies do all
6 keys well and just as importantly, they have created
an internal growth system that is consistent, linked and self-reinforcing
across culture, structure, strategy, leadership, operational processes,
HR policies, and measurement and reward systems.
The
Beginning
I began
with Enron. The extent of earnings creation through related party
transactions and financial engineering at Enron motivated me to
research the fields of earnings management and earnings quality
which led me to organic growth.
The summer
of 2002 after Enron, Standard and Poor’s ("S&P")
released their "Core Earnings Report" and Merrill Lynch
issued its "Quality of Earnings Report." These reports
caused some stir for a short period of time. There was also an
increased academic interest in financial models dealing with the
quality of earnings as evidenced by the work of Professor Patricia
Dechow at Wharton.
OGI
– An Evolutionary Step Forward
With
this background, I with a research team spent over 3,000 hours
iteratively designing a model which would accomplish three objectives:
- It would
illuminate high economic value-creating companies who
- consistently
outperformed their industry competition and
- did
so primarily through organic growth.
Research
Method
We began by
studying the existing work in the field: Stern Stewart’s EVA model,
S&P’s Core Earnings Model, and Merrill Lynch’s work. We interviewed
senior accounting and audit partners at Big 4 Accounting Firms,
reviewed academic research, key books, and SEC policies and earnings
manipulations lawsuits.
My model
was designed to meet academic statistical standards and to be
conservative. Plus I wanted to err on the side of eliminating
companies so I set high hurdles where applicable in order to increase
the probability of finding high organic growth companies.
OGI
– 7 Steps
The Organic
Growth Index ("OGI") model consists of 7 different steps
or tests. The first 3 tests are designed to illuminate the "best"
high growth companies. The last 4 tests are designed to illuminate
high organic growers amongst that pool.
Finding
High-Value Creating High Growth Companies
Test
1: EVA
We started
with Stern Stewart’s EVA model as a market accepted definition
of economic value creation. For each period (1966- 2001), (1997-
2002), and (1998- 2003), we took the top 1,000 EVA companies for
the base year. For accounting reasons, we eliminated REITS, insurance
companies and financial companies. We then computed EVA/Capital
Invested (Equity + Debt) for each company for each year and ranked
them yearly. We then averaged the ranks across the applicable
period.
Because
we were seeking the best economic value creators we chose the
top 300 companies as "winners." The number 300 was arbitrary
-- but thought to be a good sample size.
|
Test Period
|
Base # of Companies
|
Existing #
|
|
1996 – 2001
|
834
|
300
|
|
1997 – 2002
|
860
|
300
|
|
1998 – 2003
|
862
|
300
|
Tests
2 + 3 - High Growth Companies
We now
had 300 high EVA companies. How many of these companies were high
growth companies as compared to their industry competition? Was
high growth better evidenced by increasing revenues or by increasing
cash flow from operations (CFFO)? We decided to use both tests
and weight them equally.
Sales
GAGR
For each
of the 300 companies in each test period, we computed their sales
compounded annual growth rate ("CAGR") and compared
it to a six (6) digit industry average Sales CAGR using 6296 different
companies overall. We then computed a Z- statistic for each company
to normalize our results across industries.
CFFO
Growth
For each
of the 300 companies in each test period we computed its annual
change in cash flow from operations . We then divided the annual
cash flow change by the book value of assets in the initial year
in order to have a ratio to show the magnitude of the change.
We then averaged the results for each company and compared it
to the 6 digit GI CS industry average change in cash flow from
operations. We then again used Z statistics to normalize results
across industries.
CFFO Z statistic
= Company A average change in CFFO - Industry average change in
CFFO
____________________________
Standard
Deviation of Industry
For tests
two and three we used Compustat databases. To get the end result
we weighted the Z results of tests 2 and 3 equally and averaged
them. If a company had a positive net Z statistic, it passed these
two tests.
|
Test Periods
|
Entering #
|
Exiting #
|
|
1996-2001
|
300
|
170
|
|
1997-2002
|
300
|
189
|
|
1998- 2003
|
300
|
204
|
ILLUMINATING
HIGH ORGANIC GROWTH
Test
4: Modified S&P Core Earnings Test
S&P defines
"core earnings "as income associated with a company’s
"ongoing operation.". In my model, I modified their
test by dividing a company’s average S&P core earnings for
the applicable test period by its average reported net income
to create a percentage:
|
Average
Period S&P Core Earnings ≥ 90%
Average
Period Net Income
|
If the
percentage was greater than or equal to 90%, a company passed
this test. The underlying assumptions of this test were: core
earnings are a proxy for organic growth and the higher the percentage
of core earnings as compared to reported net income the higher
the likelihood a company is growing organically and not by creating
one-time nonrecurring earnings.
Test 4
Results
|
Test Periods
|
Entering #
|
Exiting #
|
|
1996-2001
|
170
|
121
|
|
1997-2002
|
189
|
106
|
|
1998- 2003
|
204
|
128
|
Test
5: Income Manipulation
A common
revenue manipulation is to accelerate income recognition either
through changing income recognition policies or by extending more
liberal credit terms or by channel stuffing.
One commonly
used method to illuminate this possibility is to compare the growth
rate of receivables to the growth rate of sales. If receivables
growth outpaces sales growth that is a strong signal that something
unusual may be going on.
I looked
at each company’s year by year change in receivables and sales
and for the applicable time period averaged their changes. If
the average annual growth rate of receivables grew more then 10%
of the annual average growth rate in sales, the company flunked
this test.
In
looking at the results for Test 5 we noticed an anomaly. Some
companies flunked this test even if they had a de minimis amount
of accounts receivables. This unintended consequence was dealt
with by adding a de minimis exception – companies with overall
accounts receivables less than 5% of sales automatically passed
this test.
Test 5
|
Test Periods
|
Entering #
|
Exiting #
|
|
1996-2001
|
121
|
93
|
|
1997- 2002
|
106
|
69
|
|
1998- 2003
|
128
|
89
|
Test
6: Merrill Lynch’s Cash Realization Test
August of 2002, Merrill Lynch introduced its Quality of Earnings
Report with the assistance of Professor David Hawkins of Harvard
Business School. One of their 4 analysis screens looked at the
ratio of a company’s CFFO to its net income. I used this concept
for Test 6 because I thought it was a strong indicator of organic
growth.
For each
company entering Test 6 for each year of the applicable test period
we computed the ratio and then averaged the ratios for each company
of
CFFO
≥90%
NI .
If the
average was equal to or greater than 90%, a company passed the
test. For this test and test 4 we created special decision rules
to apply if a number in any year was a negative number.
Test
6
|
Test Periods
|
Entering #
|
Exiting #
|
|
1996 -2001
|
93
|
87
|
|
1997 -2002
|
69
|
62
|
|
1998
- 2003
|
89
|
77
|
Test
7: The M&A Test
Historically,
academics defined organic growth as non -acquisitive growth. Again,
my purpose was to illuminate high organic growers --- not serial
acquirers of revenue. This was a difficult test to construct because
of unreliable deal data on the amount of income acquired. Because
of this, we used deal values from the SDC (Securities Data Corporation)
database and assumed that deal values were a multiplicable proxy
of income acquired, assuming accretive deals. For each test period,
we added the sum of deal values for each company as the numerator
and divided that sum by the company’s increase in market cap over
the same time period (defining market cap as equity plus debt).
If the resulting ratio was greater than or equal to 33⅓.%
the company failed.
Sum of Acquisition Values ≥ 33 ⅓ %
Increase
in Market Cap During Applicable Period
Test
7
|
Test
Period
|
Entering #
|
Exiting #
|
|
1997
– 2001
|
87
|
39
|
|
1997
– 2002
|
62
|
23
|
|
1998
– 2003
|
77
|
36
|
This test
eliminated a high percentage of companies. In Hess and Kazanjian,
eds. The Search for Organic Growth (Cambridge University
Press, 2006) Professor Rita McGrath of Columbia University discussed
her research of over 2,000 firms with market caps greater than
$1 billion dollars in which she found that only 427 firms grew
at least 5% a year for a studied time period and that only 35
of those 427 firms did so without significant acquisitions. Her
research confirms that real organic growth is difficult.
Overall
OGI Results
|
Test Periods
|
Sample Size
|
"Winners"
|
|
1996- 2001
|
834
|
39
|
|
1997- 2002
|
862
|
23
|
|
1998 -2003
|
860
|
36
|
Sixty-six
(66) different companies passed all the tests in at least one
test period. Twenty-four (24) companies passed all the tests in
at least two periods and only ten (10) companies passed all the
tests in all 3 test periods. They are listed in the Appendix.
Policy
Questions
The paucity
of consistent high organic growth companies raises fundamental
questions concerning the quality or character of earnings:
- Are all
earnings equal? Are organic growth earnings more representative
of a company’s underlying vitality and sustainability than
one time transitory or non-reoccuring earnings created by
either accounting elections, valuations, reserves, currency
gains, financial engineering, related party transactions,
investments or serial acquisitions? Should all types of earnings
be valued the same?
- Earnings
transparency – Should public companies be required by the
SEC to disclose clearly and in detail the character and source
of their earnings?
- Why
does the market accept the premise that growth must be linear
and at a consistent rate? Wall Street’s "rule" that
growth should occur linearly and quarterly is not based on
any science. Does that "rule" motivate behaviors
which are contrary to organic growth and also, substantial
fees for Wall Street?
Research
Project #2: The "How" and the "Why"
I next
set out to discover the "how" and the "why"
22 of the winners were able to do what so many companies were
not able to do – consistently create value and outcompete the
industry competition primarily through organic growth.
For
the twenty two companies I researched, the public records included
major articles, publications, company reports, filings, and industry
analyst reports. I conducted telephone interviews with 11 companies
and in-depth interviews and site visits at 7 companies: SYSCO,
TSYS, Outback Steakhouse, Tiffany and Company, Stryker Corporation,
American Eagle Outfitters, and Best Buy. My research produced
commonalities, not scientific causality.
How
did the 22 companies perform?
Performance
of 22 High-Organic Growth Companies (1996-2003)
|
Performance*
Indices
|
NASDAQ100
|
DJIA
|
S&P
500
|
22
Companies
|
|
Cumulative
Returns
|
160%
|
101%
|
80%
|
779%
|
|
Annualized
Returns
|
12.7%
|
9.1%
|
7.6%
|
31.2%
|
*CRSP Database
Their
Average Return on Equity (1999-2004) SEC Filings:
28%
My Expectations
When I
share my research findings with executives, I start by asking
them to rate the following factors as 1 ( not necessary ) or 2(
important ) or 3 (very important ) in producing consistent organic
growth.
Factor Common
Importance Rating
|
1. Better
Talent
|
2.8
|
|
2. Diversified
Strategies
|
2.5
|
|
3. Unique
Products/Services
|
2.8
|
|
4. Being
the low-cost provider
|
2.6
|
|
5. Visionary
Leadership
|
2.5
|
|
6. Charismatic
Leadership
|
2.0
|
|
7. Being
Global
|
2.3
|
|
8. Outsourcing
|
2.4
|
|
9. Off-Shoring
10.
Most Innovative
|
2.4
2.8
|
| |
|
In studying
these companies I found none of the above factors prevalent
or necessary in order to consistently produce high organic growth.
The answer to all of the above is number one (1): not necessary.
What I found common to all the companies were the 6 keys to organic
growth.
The
6 Keys
- An Elevator
Pitch Business Model
- A "Small
Company Soul" in a "Big Company Body"
- Management
Maniacs
- A People
Pipeline – Highly Engaged Employees
- Humble,
Passionate, Operators as Leaders
- Execution
and Technology Champions
Elevator
Pitch Business Model
Some
of the companies studied were primarily product focused like Gentex,
Harley-Davidson, Stryker and Tiffany and Company. Some were customer
focused like SYSCO and TSYS. Some were value proposition focused
like American Eagle Outfitters, Wal-Mart and Outback Steakhouses.
Regardless
their business model or the overall strategic focus, all had a
simple – easy to understand –easy to explain business model and
strategy which the average employee could understand and explain.
Simplicity led to more focus and to more employee engagement –
understanding how their job fits into the business and why it
is important.
These
companies had 3 common characteristics generally:
- They
were only in 1 business;
- They
resisted industry diversification; and
- They
kept their strategy and business model stable while being
fanatical about daily iterative and incremental improvements.
With
few exceptions, my winners were great incremental improvers, not
great discoverers or creators. They were not obsessed with changing
industry structure, redefining the rules of the market, or introducing
revolutionary products or services. On the contrary, these companies
were great at the "blocking and tackling" of business.
A Small
Company Soul
Corporate
leaders are challenged to obtain increased productivity from their
employees, as well as find ways to maintain a highly engaged and
energized workforce committed daily to execution excellence. Most
of the companies I studied have achieved this result because they
have entrepreneurial cultures, structured themselves to encourage
entrepreneurial behavior, and they measure and reward such behavior.
The result is highly engages employees who feel like they have
"ownership" of their job, their customers, their results
and their careers.
Measurement
Maniacs
Large
companies who want to be entrepreneurial need ways to illuminate
mistakes quickly and to keep control of the power they have delegated.
Measurements are the way.
All companies
produce financial measurements. What was interesting about the
companies I studied was that these companies:
- Measure
frequently: daily in most cases;
- They
measure key behaviors as well as financial results;
- They
use measurements to give frequent feedback; and
- They
align measurements clearly with accountability and frequent
rewards
All this is
made possible by technology. One example. Each Best Buy store
is a separate little entrepreneurial "company." Every
morning each store manager receives metrics on his or her store’s
previous day’s performance – 30 different key metrics all color
coded either green, yellow or red – all important to that store’s
ROI. And each day that store’s regional supervisor talks with
each store manager about the yellow
(warning)
and red (problem) metrics. Daily feedback and focus on the key
value drivers is made possible by a technologically enabled measurement
system.
The movement
into behavioral measurements has led some of the companies to
redefine the role of the Chief Financial Officer ("CFO")
from solely a finance role to the role of Chief Metric Officer
("CMO"). A Chief Metric Officer is responsible for everything
the CFO was responsible for in addition to designing and implementing
behavioral and operational measurements across the value chain
which drive the desired behaviors and resulting operational results.
This "drill
down" to behaviors is an iterative and constant "work
–in- progress." For example, SYSCO which has 157 different
operating units measures over 800 measurements weekly. Years ago
it adopted the "Service Value Chain" model and today
they are still iterating and drilling down further to make sure
they are measuring the right behaviors.
Employee
Engagement
The
companies I studied were all focused on high employee engagement
– high loyalty – high retention – and high productivity. What
I came to appreciate was the importance of four (4) key policies:
- Hire
for cultural fit;
- Keep
the rules of the game – how employees are measured and rewarded
-stable;
- Promote
primarily from within; and
- Create
an implied social contract – you take care of the company
and the company will take care of you.
These
companies understand that high employee turnover is costly,
time consuming and makes deep employee – customer relationships
more difficult. These companies also understand that employees
can only deal with so much change. If you want your employees
to be engaged in daily improvement (change) – doing the job
better and faster- you need to keep the macro – environment
stable and reliable. This creates trust between the employee
and the company without which you can not have high employee
engagement. The "rules of the game" – how one is
measured, rewarded and promoted need to remain stable. The
strategy and leadership of the company need to be stable,
thus the individual employee can more likely deal with the
pressure of daily execution improvement.
For
example, the average employee tenure at TSYS is 7 years. The
average store manager at Walgreens has 13 years tenure. All
of the 22 companies’ leadership teams had an average 20 plus
years’ tenure with the company. 76% of Wal-Mart store managers
started as hourly employees. Tiffany promotes from within
70% of the time. Best Buy’s employee turnover is 20% below
industry average and their short – term goal is to be 50%
below industry average.
These
22 companies have not lost sight of a fundamental management
truth: business is conducted by and with people. Business
objectives are realized by line employees. Great companies
understand the importance of high employee satisfaction and
engagement. Without that, consistent high quality daily execution
is difficult.
Leaders
– Humble Passionate Operators
The
leaders of these companies I studied were surprisingly humble
and were primarily operators intimately involved in the details
of execution – not just strategy, Wall Street finance, industry
groups, global politics, etc. In many ways my work confirmed
Jim Collin’s findings of Level V Leadership – humility and
passionate will.
One
example. When I interviewed the top 8 executives at Tiffany
and Company in New York City I thought – this is the "perfect
storm" for arrogance and hubris. New York City – Wall
Street – wealth – fashion – jewelry. I expected the CEO to
be dressed to the hilt – designer Italian suits, designer
British or Hong Kong shirts, cuff links, jewelry etc., and
that he would spend very little time with me. I was wrong.
All were humble, understated servant leaders. All were focused
on stewardship of the great brand that had been passed to
them. Tiffany’s motto is "Growth Without Compromise."
Other
than pay, many of these companies fight executive elitism
and the resulting arrogance and hubris that develop by eliminating
executive perks such as corporate jets, lavish private offices,
reserved parking spaces, chauffeured cars, executive dining
rooms and other indicia of executive elitism. As Tiffany’s
President Jim Quinn stated so succinctly, "There is only
1 star here and that is Tiffany."
Execution
and Technology Champions
High
organic growth companies are also execution and technology
champions. These companies have worked hard to engineer process
and technologically enable their entire value chain to drive
operations efficiently and productively, and have engrained
the following entrepreneurial processes into their culture
and operating fabric:
- Engineering
process;
-
The scientific method;
- Iteration;
and
-
A Do, Test, Learn, Adapt mentality
Organic
Growth Strategies
The relentless
pursuit of organic growth is not pure. Many of these companies
made small acquisitions of enabling technology, new products,
new concepts, or new customer segments. What was interesting was
that many of these acquisitions were small in value and at the
early stages of the product, technology or concept life cycle.
So acquisitions
were not forbidden – but they were strategic and related to the
core business and except for one instance they were not large
in scale. Interestingly enough, when you track the evolution of
many of these companies they evolved along a similar continuum,
sequence or progression.
The Common
Progression of Organic Growth
Step
Action______________________________
1. You
expand your business geographically.
2. You
introduce complementary products for existing customers.
3. You
move into a new customer segment with your products.
4. You
add complementary services for existing customers.
5. You
focus on cost efficiencies.
6. You
focus on technological productivity in the supply-chain, logistics,
and manufacturing functions.
7. You
use technology to focus on customer knowledge and service.
8. You
then focus on people measurement, hiring, and training
9. You
add or acquire a complementary new concept.
10. You
change from a product company to a customer-solutions company.
11. You
start over at step 1.
12. You
simultaneously improve in all 10 areas yearly.
Conclusion:
Organic Growth is More Than A Strategy – It is a
System
Lastly, what
I learned from these companies was that organic growth was not
just a strategy. The hard part was the sensitivity, constant vigilance
and discipline to keep all parts of the system linked, consistent
and self – reinforcing. Strategy, culture, structure, execution
processes, people policies, accountability, measurement and reward
systems had to all be aligned and consistently managed. These
companies were vigilant and highly sensitive about sending inconsistent
messages to employees and customers which could create hypocrisy
– the deadly killer of trust.
APPENDIX
A "OGI WINNERS"
|
1996–2001
|
1997–2002
|
1998–2003
|
|
1.
American Eagle Outfitters, Inc.
|
1.
American Eagle Outfitters, Inc.
|
1.
American Eagle Outfitters, Inc
|
|
2.
Apollo Group, Inc.
|
2.
Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc.
|
2.
American Pharma Partners Inc.
|
|
3.
Aptargroup, Inc.
|
3.
Automatic Data Processing
|
3.
Applebees International, Inc.
|
|
4.
Arvinmeritor, Inc.
|
4.
Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc.
|
4.
Avon Products
|
|
5.
Automatic Data Processing
|
5.
Best Buy Co., Inc.
|
5.
Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc.
|
|
6.
Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc.
|
6.
Brinker Intl., Inc.
|
6.
Best Buy Co., Inc.
|
|
7.
Best Buy Co., Inc.
|
7.
C H Robinson Worldwide, Inc.
|
7.
Biomet, Inc.
|
|
8.
BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc.
|
8.
Family Dollar Stores
|
8.
Brinker Intl., Inc.
|
|
9.
CEC Entertainment, Inc.
|
9.
Gentex Corp.
|
9.
Cognizant Tech Solutions
|
|
10.
Chevron Texaco Corp.
|
10.
Harley-Davidson, Inc.
|
10.
Columbia Sportswear Co.
|
|
11.
Colgate-Palmolive Co.
|
11.
Lincare Holdings, Inc.
|
11.
Costco Wholesale Corp.
|
|
12.
Devry, Inc.
|
12.
Mylan Laboratories
|
12.
Coventry Health Care, Inc.
|
|
13.
Dollar General Corp.
|
13.
NVR, Inc.
|
13.
Del Monte Foods Co.
|
|
14.
Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.
|
14.
Omnicom Group
|
14.
Dollar General Corp
|
|
15.
EOG Resources, Inc.
|
15.
Outback Steakhouse, Inc.
|
15.
EOG Resources, Inc.
|
|
16.
Ethan Allen Interiors, Inc.
|
16.
Paccar, Inc.
|
16.
Family Dollar Stores
|
|
17.
Family Dollar Stores
|
17.
Ross Stores, Inc.
|
17.
Gentex Corp
|
|
18.
Gentex Corp.
|
18.
Ruby Tuesday, Inc.
|
18.
Harley-Davidson, Inc.
|
|
19.
Home Depot, Inc.
|
19.
SYSCO Corp
|
19.
Intl. Game Technology
|
|
20.
Jack In The Box, Inc.
|
20.
Tiffany & Co.
|
20.
Lowe’s Companies, Inc.
|
|
21.
La-Z-Boy, Inc.
|
21.
Walgreen Co.
|
21.
NVR, Inc.
|
|
22.
Leggett & Platt, Inc.
|
22.
Wal-Mart Stores
|
22.
Omnicom Group
|
|
23.
Masco Corp.
|
23.
Waters Corp
|
23.
Outback Steakhouse, Inc.
|
|
24.
Molex, Inc.
|
|
24.
Pogo Producing Co.
|
|
25.
Mylan Laboratories
|
|
25.
Ross Stores, Inc.
|
|
26.
Nike, Inc.
|
|
26.
Ruby Tuesday, Inc.
|
|
27.
Omnicom Group
|
|
27.
Ryland Group, Inc.
|
|
28.
Outback Steakhouse, Inc.
|
|
28.
Smucker (JM) Co.
|
|
29.
Paccar, Inc.
|
|
29.
Stryker Corp.
|
|
30.
Renal Care Group, Inc.
|
|
30.
SYSCO Corp.
|
|
31.
Stryker Corp.
|
|
31.
Tiffany & Co.
|
|
32.
SYSCO Corp.
|
|
32.
Total System Services, Inc.
|
|
33.
Teleflex, Inc.
|
|
33.
Urban Outfitters, Inc.
|
|
34.
Timberland Co.
|
|
34.
Walgreen Co.
|
|
35.
Total System Services, Inc.
|
|
35.
Wal-Mart Stores
|
|
36.
Walgreens Co.
|
|
36.
XTO Energy, Inc.
|
|
37.
Wal-Mart Stores
|
|
|
|
38.
Waters Corp.
|
|
|
|
39.
WellPoint Health Networks, Inc.
|
|
|
APPENDIX
B 24 – 2 + TIMES WINNERS
|
Company
Name
|
St
Stock Symbol
|
|
1. American
Eagle Outfitters, Inc.
|
AEOS
|
|
2. Automatic
Data Processing, Inc.
|
ADP
|
|
3. Bed
Bath & Beyond, Inc.
|
BBBY*
|
|
4. Best
Buy Co., Inc.
|
BBY*
|
|
5. Brinker
International, Inc.
|
EAT
|
|
6. Dollar
General Corporation
|
DG
|
|
7. EOG
Resources, Inc.
|
EOG
|
|
8. Family
Dollar Stores, Inc.
|
FDO*
|
|
9. Gentex
Corporation
|
GNTX*
|
|
10.
Harley-Davidson, Inc.
|
HDJ
|
|
11.
Mylan Laboratories, Inc.
|
MYL
|
|
12.
NVR, Inc.
|
NVR
|
|
13.
Omnicom Group, Inc.
|
OMC*
|
|
14.
Outback Steakhouse, Inc.
|
OSI*
|
|
15.
PACCAR, Inc.
|
PCAR
|
|
16.
Ross Stores, Inc.
|
ROST
|
|
17.
Ruby Tuesdays, Inc
|
RI
|
|
18.
Stryker Corporation
|
SYK
|
|
19.
SYSCO Corporation
|
SYY*
|
|
20.
Tiffany & Company
|
TIF
|
|
21.
Total Systems Services, Inc. (TSYS)
|
TSS
|
|
22.
Walgreen Co.
|
WAG*
|
|
23.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
|
WMT*
|
|
24.
Waters Corporation
|
WAT
|
Appendix
C The 10 Organic Growth Champions: Winners in all 3 Periods
|
1. American
Eagle Outfitters, Inc.
|
AEOS*
|
|
2..
Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc.
|
BBBY*
|
|
3. Best
Buy Co., Inc.
|
BBY*
|
|
4. Family
Dollar Stores, Inc.
|
FDO*
|
|
5. Gentex
Corporation
|
GNTX*
|
|
6. Omnicom
Group, Inc.
|
OMC*
|
|
7. Outback
Steakhouse, Inc.
|
OSI*
|
|
8.SYSCO
Corporation
|
SYY*
|
|
9. Walgreen
Co.
|
WAG*
|
|
10.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
|
WMT*
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|

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